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PARTISAN MONETARY POLICIES: PRESIDENTIAL 
INFLUENCE THROUGH THE POWER OF APPOINTMENT* 
HENRY W. CHAPPELL, JR. 
THOMAS M. HAVRILESKY 
ROB Roy MCGREGOR 
We investigate the channels through which partisan mfluence from a Presiden-
tial administratIOn could affect monetary policy-making. Influence could be a result 
of direct Presidential pressure exerted on members of the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC), or It could be a result of partisan conSideratIons m Presidential 
appomtments to the Board of Governors. To investIgate these two channels of 
mfluence, we deVise and apply a method for estimating parameters of monetary 
policy reaction functIOns that can vary across indiVidual members of the FOMC 
Our results suggest that the appomtments process IS the primary mechamsm by 
which partisan differences m monetary policies anse. 
The behavior of the Federal Reserve has often been modeled 
using monetary policy reaction functions, which empirically link a 
policy instrument, perhaps an interest rate or a monetary aggre-
gate, to economic goal variables like inflation, output growth, and 
unemployment. Under the assumption of a stable macroeconomic 
structure, estimated reaction function coefficients reveal informa-
tion about the weights the Fed attaches to the various goal 
variables. More generally, reaction functions conveniently describe 
the implicit policy rule the Fed has followed over a given sample 
period. 1 
Reaction functions have also been used to investigate the role 
of political forces on monetary policies. Some findings support the 
existence of a political business cycle pattern in which monetary 
*We acknowledge the able research assistance of Ronald Gill, Jane Norton, and 
Michael Nelson Helpful comments on earlier drafts were prOVided by Robert 
Auerbach, Nathamel Beck, McKmley Blackburn, Jamce Boucher, Charles Evans, 
DaVId Garman, John GIldea, Kevin Grier, SIU-KJ Leung, Pedro Portugal, Paul 
Whitely, and two anonymous referees We have also benefited from comments 
offered m semmars at Clemson Umversity, Duke Umversity, the Umversity of 
North Carolina at Charlotte, the Umversity of South Carolma, and the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago FinanCial support was provided by NatIOnal Science 
Foundation grants SES-9122322 and SES-9121941 
1 Dewald and Johnson [1963], Reuber [1964], and Wood [1967] proVide early 
applicatIOns of the reactIOn functIon techmque Abrams, Froyen, and Waud [1980] 
introduce methodologiml extensIOns that have been widely adopted and are useful 
in our work Barth, Sickles, and Wiest [1982], Gildea [1985], and Khoury [1990] 
provide comprehensive surveys 
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ease IS observed before elections.2 A somewhat stronger case can be 
made for the existence of partIsan influences from Presidential 
administrations. 3 Conventional wisdom suggests that Democratic 
administrations prefer "easy" monetary policies, whIle Republican 
admmistrations prefer monetary "tightness" If Presidents can 
influence members ofthe Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), 
the Fed's primary policy-making unit, then monetary policy IS 
likely to shift with partisan changes in the Presidency Empirical 
studies have modeled such partisan mfluences by adding a dummy 
variable indicating the party of the President to monetary policy 
reaction functions, or by estimating separate reaction functions for 
periods of Democratic and Republican leadership. Most studies 
show some systematic partisan mfluence. 
The preceding argument assumes that a PresIdent's partisan 
impact on monetary policy is a result of dIrect influence over 
FOMC members,4 but another channel of influence IS also avail-
able. Members of the Fed's Board of Governors, who are FOMC 
members, are appointed by the President. One would expect that 
partisan preferences would affect the appointments process, and 
evidence from analyses of FOMC voting patterns supports this 
view. 5 
Specifications for aggregate reaction functIOns (i.e., those 
describing the behavior of the Fed as a whole) cannot easily capture 
partIsan influences resulting from the appointments process. The 
seven Governors serve overlapping terms of fourteen years, so 
Presidents make appointments mfrequently as terms expire or as 
Governors resign. ThIS implies that changes m the partisan 
2 See Allen [1986], Beck [1984, 19871, Grier [19891, Laney and Willett [19831, 
and Haynes and Stone [1989] for eVidence regarding a pohtlcal monetary cycle 
Haynes and Stone and Gner find support for the hypothesIs of pre-electIOn 
stimulus, while Allen and Laney and Willett find some eVidence that the Fed 
accommodates fiscal pohcy vanatlOns that are elect orally hmed Beck rejects the 
hypotheSIS of a pohtlCal monetary cycle Havnlesky 11987, 1988a, 1990a, 1990b] 
finds support for a "pubhc chOice" model of the pohhcal busmess cycle, m wluch 
mter-electlOn cycles are motivated by redlstnbutJve fiscal pohcles 
3 See Alesma and Sachs [1988], Beck [19841, Chappell and Keech [1986, 
1988], Grier and Neiman [1987], Haynes and Stone [19891, Havnlesky [19871, and 
Hibbs [1987] for eVidence of partisan mfluences on the Fed 
4 Beck [1982], Havrllesky [1988b], Kane [19801, and Wemtraub [1978J have 
argued that Presidents have substantial mfluence over the Federal Reserve Later 
m the paper we mveshgate whether Presidential Signals mfluence pohcy m ways 
that are not systematically partIban 
5 Puckett [1984], Woolley [1984], and Havnlesky and Gildea [1992[ provide 
eVidence that Democrahc appomtees dissent more frequently m favor of ease, while 
Republican appomtees dissent more frequently m favor of tightness Other studies 
of dissent votmg patterns mclude Belden [1989], Canterbery [19671, Gildea [1990 I, 
Havnlesky and Schweitzer [1990], and Yohe [1966J 
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makeup of the FOMC follow changes in the partisan status of the 
Presidential administration in a delayed, gradual, and somewhat 
irregular manner. Including a dummy variable for the party of the 
incumbent President in an aggregate reaction function is not likely 
to fully capture partisan influences by way of the appointments 
process. 
In this paper we investigate the sources of partisan influence 
on monetary policy-making using a technique that overcomes 
limitations of the aggregate reaction function approach. We de-
velop a method for estimating reaction function parameters that 
vary across mdLV~dual members of the FOMC. Our estimates 
permit us to infer whether members are directly influenced by the 
partisan ideology of the current President, and whether they 
systematically differ according to the party of the President who 
appomted them If influence flows through both channels, we can 
assess the relative importance ofthe two. 
Apart from its focus on the channels of partisan influence, our 
analysis is distinguished in three important ways from previous 
studies that have estimated aggregate reaction functIOns or ana-
lyzed FOMC voting patterns. First, our model links policy out-
comes to the reaction functions of individuals serving on the 
FOMC. This linkage provides micro foundations for aggregate 
reaction functions and permits an empirical appraisal of the 
balance of power between the Chairman and other FOMC mem-
bers. Second, by specifying variations across individuals as differ-
ences in reaction function parameters, we can control for the state 
of the economy and prevailing policy stances when we assess 
individuals' FOMC voting records. Some FOMC members may 
have frequently dissented favoring tightness not because their 
preferences were much different from other members, but because 
policy was unusually "easy" during their tenures, or because 
inflationary conditIOns warranted additional tightness. ThIrd, the 
use of reaction fun ctions permits us to interpret differences across 
individuals in terms of desired settings for a policy instrument. 
Such comparisons are more meaningful indicators of pohcy prefer-
ences than dissent voting frequencies are. 
Our findings will also address broader macroeconomic Issues. 
Chappell and Keech [1986, 1988] and Alesma and Sachs [1988] 
have proposed models m which partisan changes drive electorally 
timed business cycles. In these models newly elected Presidential 
administrations can alter the stance of monetary policy to reflect 
their partisan preferences. Because election outcomes are uncer-
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tain, partisan shifts m monetary pohcies contain surprise elements 
that produce business cycle fluctuations. However, If the appoint-
ments process provides the major channel of partisan influence, 
then shifts in monetary policies will lag the election and dimimsh 
the importance of election surprises. A finding to this effect would 
undermine these models of partisan political business cycles. 
We begin in Section I by describing our model and the method 
used to estimate it. The data employed and the empirical specifica-
tion are presented in Section II. Empirical results are presented in 
Section III, and extensions are discussed in Section IV. Section V 
offers conclusions. 
I. A MODEL OF FOMe DECISION MAKING 
FOMe members' votes on monetary pohcy directives are 
observable, but these votes do not directly reveal individuals' most 
preferred policies. As a result, previous studies have not attempted 
to estimate conventional policy reaction functions for individuals. 
Here we develop a model of FOMe decision making that permits 
reaction function parameters to vary across committee members 
and that can be estimated using available macroeconomic tIme 
series and FOMe voting records.6 Our presentation in thIS section 
proceeds by discussmg the specification of policy preferences of 
individual FOMe members, the linkage between those preferences 
and resulting policy outcomes, FOMe voting behavior, and issues 
assocIated wIth estImation. 
A. Individuals' Reactwn Functions 
As in aggregate reaction function analyses, we must designate 
a specific variable as the policy instrument controlled by the Fed. 
We have chosen the Federal funds rate for that purpose ThIS 
choice could be challenged on the grounds that the Fed is unable to 
manipulate the funds rate or that it has chosen alternative targets. 
However, most observers agree that the Fed has targeted the funds 
rate with considerable success over the postwar period. 7 Some have 
6 Tootell [1991a, 1991 b 1 has estimated mdlvldual-level reactIOn functIOns, but 
the dependent varIable in hIS reactIon functIOns IS a categOrIcal varIable based on 
FOMe votes HIS varIable deSCrIbes a member's preferred polIcy m relatIOn to 
current polIcy (1 e , tighter, eaSler, or no change) In contrast, we estImate mdlvldual 
reactIOn functIOns that speCIfy a deSIred settmg for a polIcy mstrument as the 
dependent varIable, as do most aggregate reactIOn functIOn studIes 
7 Most empIrIcal studIes show that, at a mmImum, the Fed has attempted to 
mfluence short-run mterest rates over most of the perIod studIed m thIS paper In 
reactIOn functIOn contexts Beck [1982] and FaIr [1984] prOVIde confirmmg eVIdence 
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even argued that the funds rate remained a target during the 
1979-1982 interlude when the Fed ostensibly adopted a nonbor-
rowed reserve operating procedure. For example, Goodfriend [1990] 
reports that "except for the period from 1934 to the end of the 
1940s when short term interest rates were near zero or pegged, the 
Fed has always employed either a direct or an indirect Federal 
funds rate policy instrument." 
We specify individuals' reaction functions so that partisan 
differences across FOMC members can be represented very simply. 
We assume that each of the N members of the FOMC (excluding 
the Chairman) has a desired interest rate reaction function of the 
following form: 8 
K J 
(1) rft = ao + ~ aJJkLl + ~ l3.rX;t + ea, 
k=l ;=1 
i = 1, ... , N; t = 1, ... , T. 
The dependent variable r~t is member i's desired Federal funds rate 
for the intermeeting period following meeting t. This variable is 
unobserved. The independent variables ~t,j = 1, ... , J, are those 
that vary over time but not across individuals. Among these are 
forecast values of macroeconomic variables of concern to the Fed 
(e.g., inflation, unemployment, and growth). The ~t also include 
dummy variables to indicate the partisan identity of the current 
President, which should capture the effects of systematic partisan 
influence from the President and the executive branch in general. 
The remaining independent variables Dklt , k = 1, ... , K vary 
across both members and time. Specifically included are dummy 
variables indicating Governors appointed by Republican and Dem-
ocratic Presidents, which capture partisan influences channeled 
through the power of appointment. The model could be generalized 
to include other measures of individual characteristics or individual-
specific dummies, but here we limit our attention to partisan 
distinctions. 
Note that the parameters in (1) are not subscripted by i; we 
assume that differences between members are completely de-
Cook and Hahn [1989], by exarmmng interest rate reactions to changes In Fed 
target rates, show that the Fed Influences not only the Federal funds rate but also 
longer term interest rates Bernanke and Bhnder [1992] prOVIde eVIdence that 
movements In the funds rate are pnmarlly a consequence of Fed pohcles rather than 
money demand shifts, and they also argue that the funds rate IS the best predIctor of 
future movements of real macroeconomIC variables 
8. When there are no vacanCIeS or absences on the FOMC, N = 11 
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scribed by intercept shifts captured by the coefficients of the 
partisan appointment variables. While this characterization of 
differences is restrictive, data limitations argue against ncher 
distinctions. 
We specify a sImilar desired mterest rate reaction functlOn for 
the Chairman (who is mdicated by the position index 0) which 
differs only slightly from that for other FOMC members: 
M J 
(2) rbt = 00 + L OmCmt + L f3;A;t + eot. t = 1, ... , T. 
m=l j~l 
The partisan appointment dummies of equation (1) are replaced m 
equation (2) by a senes of dummy variables, Cmt, m = 1, . , M, 
indIcating specific Chairmen (e.g., Volcker, MIller, etc.). ThIS 
specificatlOn is more general than one that would require each 
Chairman's intercept to match those of other members falhng 
under the same partisan appointment category GIven the special 
mfluence often attributed to the Chairman, and glVen the small 
number of Chairmen serving in our sample period, this generaliza-
tion seems appropriate. Because some Chairmen have been ap-
pointed by Presidents of both parties, the proper coding of partisan 
attachments would be questionable in any case. We continue to 
assume that coefficients of other variables in the reaction function 
are Identical for Chmrmen and other members. 
Error terms for the reaction functions (1) and (2) are assumed 
to be identically distributed normal random variables that are 
un correlated over time and across indivlduals: 9 
E(e
,t ) = 0, E(e~) = (T2, for l = 0, ... ,N, t = 1, .. , T; 
E(e,tejs) = 0, for l ;c J or t ;c s. 
B. Monetary Policy ChOlces and FOMC Votlng 
Monetary pohcy directives are adopted by a majonty vote of 
the FOMC at regularly scheduled meetings of the commIttee In 
these meetings the discussion of monetary policy typically begins 
with the presentation of a staff report that assesses current 
macroeconomic conditions and provides forecasts under alterna-
tive policy scenarios. This is followed by the policy "go-around" m 
whlCh individual FOMC members present additlOnal mformatlOn 
9 A generahzahon permlttlllg correlated errors across members at a moment 
III time IS dIscussed III note 32 ExtenSIOns IllvestIgatlllg pOSSIble senal correlatIOn 
are dIscussed bnefly III note 19 and more thoroughly III an appendIX avaIlable from 
the authors 
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and broach policy strategies. The Chairman (or occasionally a 
member designated by the Chairman) then suggests a proposal for 
the monetary poliey directive. If further discussion indicates that 
this proposal is deemed suitable by a majority of the voting 
committee members, then final language for the directive is 
crafted, and a formal vote is taken. In practice, formal votes are 
taken only when approval by a majority is assured. The language of 
policy directives is intentionally vague, but our assumption is that 
the directive implicitly embraces a target for the Federal funds 
rate. At times the target has been explicit. 
The Chairman plays key roles in FOMC deliberations as a 
consensus builder and as an agenda setter. By all accounts the Fed 
places a high value on consensus, and the Chairman must orches-
trate that consensus. However, by mindfully choosing his proposed 
policy directive, the Chairman may be able to tilt policy choices in a 
direction he favors. Woolley [1984] has suggested that the Chair-
man may also gain some leverage over the committee through his 
functions as a liaison between the Fed and the outside world and as 
an internal allocator of Fed resources. In recognition of his 
distinctive sway over monetary policy, some have referred to the 
Chairman as the second most powerful man in Washington. lO 
We believe, therefore, that it is appropriate to model the 
Chairman as proposing a target for the Federal funds rate on which 
the committee votes.l1 To reflect both the consensus-building and 
agenda-setting roles of the Chairman in a tractable formulation, 
our model specifies that his proposed funds rate r t be a weighted 
average of his own desired rate and the mean desired rate of all 
other members: 
(3) 1/12 :s 'Y :s 1.0, 
where 
(4) r* = (~) ~>* t N <=1 <t 
and 'Y is the weight attached to the Chairman's desired interest 
rate. We assume that the Chairman has at least as much influence 
as other members (-y ;::: 1/12), and permit the possibility that he is 
10. In an annual rankmg of powerful indIVlduals, U S. News and World Report 
hsted Federal Reserve Chrurman Paul Volcker in second place, behInd only the 
PresIdent [U. S. News and World Report, May 10,1982] 
11 The Ch81rman has a formal vote, but SInce none has ever dIssented we 
regard his votIng as superfluous. ' 
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dictatorial (-y = 1.0). Since the Chairman's proposed funds rate is 
ultimately adopted, rt is observed in the postmeeting period. 
Once the Chairman has proposed a Federal funds rate target 
to the committee, the remaming members can dissent in favor of 
"ease," dissent in favor of "tightness," or assent. The discrete 
variable Va, referring to the vote by member i in meetmg t, is 
defined to equal -1, 1, or 0 in these three cases. 12 Because of 
internal pressures to present a united external front, members are 
apparently reluctant to dissent; they do so only when dIsagree-
ments are acute. 13 Accordingly, we assume that a member dissents 
only when the difference between the proposed Federal funds rate 
and his desired rate exceeds a threshold level '1\ > O. 
(5a) ifrt - rit > '1\, then V,t = -1; 
(5b) ifrt - rit < -'1\, then V,[ = 1; 
(5c) if - '1\ ~ r t - rii ~ '1\, then v,[ = O. 
Condition (5a) says that if the proposed rate exceeds his 
desired rate by more than '1\ units, then member i wIll dissent 
favoring ease. Similarly, (5b) says that if the proposed rate is less 
than his desired rate by more than '1\ units, then member l will 
dissent favoring tightness. Finally, (5c) says that if the difference 
12 The Record of Polley Actwns for FOMC meetmgs bnefly describes mem-
bers' reasons for dlssentmg votes In all but a few cases, these explanatIOns can be 
coded to mdlcate dissents favormg ease or tightness For example, at the FOMe 
meetmg held on August 20, 1985, Reserve Bank President Robert Black dissented 
" because he preferred to direct open market operatIOns promptly toward a 
somewhat greater degree of reserve restramt and thereby Improve the prospects of 
moderatmg M1 growth to wlthm the Committee's range for the second half of the 
year" ["Record of PolIcy ActIOns of the Federal Open Market Committee," Federal 
Reserve Bulletm, LXXI, December 1985, p. 954] Black IS accordmgly coded as 
havmg dissented for tightness At the same meetmg Governor Martha Seger 
dissented" because she favored some reductIOn m the degree of reserve restramt 
m lIght of the finanCial vulnerabilIty of some sectors of the economy and m order to 
encourage sustamed economic expansIOn" [Federal Reserve Bulletm, 1985, p 954J 
Seger IS accordmgly coded as havmg dissented for easE' 
13 Henry Wallich has Said, "It IS not a pleasant thmg to have to keep 
dlssentmg One dissents less frequently than you would thmk After all, you are a 
member of a group and you want to get along With the other members" [Greider, 
1987, p 201] Nancy Teeters vOices Similar ImpreSSIOns "Once a consensus IS 
formed, there IS a very strong temptatIOn to fall mIme" [Greider, 1987, p 221] 
Preston Martm says. "Unless you were there, an 'mslder,' you cannot comprehend 
the power at play m consensus bUlldmg, the frustratIOn at times m acceptmg those 
deCISIOns for the sake of market stabilIty, and the compellmg case at other hmes for 
dissent and even for takmg your vote public for reasons of conscience" [Wall Street 
Journal, August 5, 1987J The FOMC's Memoranda ofDlscusswn for Apn118, 1972 
[p 467], prOVides an even more revealmg diSCUSSIOn of the calculus of votmg m 
reportmg the comments of Alfred Hayes "Mr Hayes Said he was reluctant to vote 
affirmatively because he was dissatisfied With the proposed course He planned to do 
so, however, because the difference of view was not suffiCiently great to warrant hiS 
castmg a russentmg vote " 
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between desired and proposed rates is less than A in absolute value, 
then member i assents. 
We next consider estimation of the model. Parameters to be 
estimated include not only reaction function coefficients for Chair-
men and members, but also "(, the weight attached to the Chair-
man's preferences in the policy process, and A, the threshold 
parameter for dissent voting. 
C. Estimation of the Model 
Substituting (1), (2), and (4) into (3) yields a reduced-form 
equation for the postmeeting Federal funds rate: 
M J 




+ (1 - "() L UkDkt + "(eOt + (1 - "(Yet, 
k~1 
and 
This equation contains only exogenous variables; its reduced-form 
coefficients can be consistently estimated by ordinary least squares 
(OLS). Moreover, OLS can provide direct estimates of the ~kS (the 
coefficients of economic variables and the current President parti-
san dummies). Assuming that "( ;t!; 1.0, one can also test the null 
hypothesis of no partisan appointment effects (i.e., that Oi.k = 0 for 
k = 1, ... , K). It is not possible to identify all of the structural 
parameters in (6) from its reduced-form estimates, 14 but additional 
information is provided by the voting behavior of individual FOMC 
members. 
Again considering voting behavior, we substitute (1) and (6) 
into conditions (5) to obtain 
M K 
(7a) if "(80 + (1 - "()Oi.o - 01.0 + "( L OmCmt + (1 - "() L UkDkt 
m=l k=l 
K 
- L UkDht + ,,{eOt + (1 - ,,{Yet - e,t > A, then V,t = -1; 
k=l 
14 We can estImate M + J + K + 1 reduced-form coeffiCIents by OLS 
estimatIOn of (6), but the equatIOn mcludes M + J + K + 3 structural parameters. 
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M K 
(7b) If 'YOo + (1 - 'Y)<Xo - <Xo + 'Y L OmCmt + (1 - 'Y) L <XkDkt 
m=1 k=1 
K 
- L <XkDk,t + 'YeOt + (1 - 'Y)et - elf < -A, then V,t = 1; 
k=1 
M 
(7c) if -A S; 'Yoo + (1 - 'Y)<Xo - <Xo + 'Y L omCmt 
K K 
+ (1 - 'Y) L <XkDkt - L <XkDk,t + 'YeOt 
k=1 k=1 
+ (1 - 'Y)et - e,t S; A, then Vzt = o. 
Conditions (7) characterize a reduced-form ordered probIt model. 15 
If we normalize in the standard fashion for probit models by setting 
the variance of the composite error term equal to an arbitrary 
constant, then reduced-form coefficients of (7) can be estImated 
using voting data for member i. 16 Since the <XkS can be estimated, 
the reduced-form probit model provides an alternative test of 
partisan appointment effects. 
Given reduced-form estimates of both (6) and (7), and given 
restrictions relating error variances and covariances across equa-
tions, all of the model's structural parameters can be identIfied. 
Even the conventional normahzation of the probit equation error 
variance is not required, since cross-equation restrIctions identify 
that parameter. Methods analogous to indirect least squares (lLS) 
could be used to infer structural parameters from reduced-form 
estimates, but ILS can yield a multiplicity of estimates, depending 
upon WhICh identifying restrictions are imposed in solving for 
structural parameters. Statistical testing is also problematic under 
ILS. 
Full informatIOn maximum likelihood (FIML) methods pro-
vide an alternative technique for estimating systems of equations 
with limited dependent variablesY Because of the complexity of 
15 McKelvey and Zavoma [1975] describe the ordered probit model and 
prOVide an applicatIOn to roll-call votmg m the U S Congress 
16 The parameters of (7) can be estimated usmg a data set contammg the vote 
of Just one member per meetmg. Poolmg over members and time to estimate (7) 
would also be possIble, but the statistical propertIes of the estimates would be 
questIOnable because reduced-form errors are correlated across members withm a 
meetmg 
17 Heckman [1978J and Maddala [1983] desCribe FIML estimation techniques 
for such models Instrumental variables methods like those proposed by Nelson and 
Olsen [1978] can also be used to estimate probit models WIth endogenous explana-
tory varIables One dIsadvantage of the mstrumental varIables methods IS that they 
fail to make use of cross-equation restrictIOns like those Implied by our model 
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computing multiple integrals of multivariate normal distribution 
functions, FIML is feasible only when the number of limited 
dependent variables in the system is small. In the model considered 
here, twelve variables are determined in a typical meeting of the 
FOMC-the postmeeting Federal funds rate and the discrete votes 
of eleven FOMC members-making FIML estimation impractical. 
A related technique based on the maximum likelihood method 
is feasible, however. A special feature of our model is that the 
probit equations determining members' votes within a meeting are 
identical across individuals; individual differences are captured by 
the series of partisan appointment dummies. Consequently, to 
estimate all model parameters, we need only estimate a model 
including one equation determining the Federal funds rate and one 
of eleven identical voting equations. The maximum likelihood 
method can be applied to the estimation of such a two-equation 
system. (Appendix 1 presents the likelihood function for this 
model.) To do so, we employ voting observations for one member 
per meeting, while discarding the votes of others. This does not 
make use of all available data, but it does impose all cross-equation 
restrictions; it can also be repeated using alternative sets of vot-
ing observations. For each set of estimates, hypotheses can be 
tested using conventional statistics based upon the likelihood 
function. 
To carry out the estimation, we proceed in the following way. 
1. For each meeting randomly draw, and assign position 
numbers 1 through 11 across members (without replace-
ment). Specific individuals can be assigned different posi-
tion numbers in different meetings. 
2. Estimate structural parameters in (6) and (7) jointly by the 
maximum likelihood method, using only the over-time 
voting observations for members assigned the position 
number 1. 
3. Repeat step 2 separately for members assigned the position 
numbers 2, 3, ... , 11. 
4. Compute mean values of the estimates for each parameter 
over the eleven sets of estimates. 
This procedure will produce eleven separate sets of consistent 
estimates for the model's parameters; the means of consistent 
estimates are also consistent. 
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II. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
We now consider the empirical counterparts to equations (1) 
and (2). The individuals' and ChaIrmen's reaction functions are 
specified below: 
(I') r~ = 0:0 + O:DApDAPa + O:RAPRAPa + O:ssAPSSAP,t + I3DcpDCPt 
+ I3RcpRCPt + I3r rt-l + I3M1Mlt- 1 + I3PPt + l3uUt + I3IPIPt + e,t· 
(2') rOt = 00 + OVOLCKER VOLCKERt + oMILLERMILLERt 
+ 0BuRNsBURNSt + I3DcpDCPt + I3RcpRCPt + I3r r t - 1 
+ I3M1Ml t - 1 + I3PPt + l3uUt + I3IpIPt + eat· 
For Governors, equation (I') includes three dummy variables 
to indicate the partisan identification of the appointing President. 
Conventionally one would identify Governors as either Republican 
or Democratic appointees, but Havrilesky and Gildea [1991b, 1992] 
have found that the "supply-side" appointees of Ronald Reagan 
differ notably from the appointees of other Republican Presidents. 
Most studies have suggested that Republicans lean toward mone-
tary tightness, but the Reagan appointees have been strong 
advocates of monetary ease. Greider [1987] concurs in his histori-
cal account, attributing the move toward easier policy in the 
mid-1980s to the influence of the Reagan appointees. We therefore 
define the three dummy variables DAP, RAP, and SSAP to mdicate 
Democratic appointees, traditional (i.e., non-Reagan) Republican 
appointees, and supply-side (i.e., Reagan) Republican appointees. 
Regional Bank Presidents are represented m the intercept The 
Chairman's equation adds dummies for Chairmen Paul Volcker, G. 
William Miller, and Arthur Burns (with Wilham McChesney 
Martin accounted for in the intercept) and drops the partisan 
dummies. 
The President's direct partisan influence IS captured in the 
DCP and RCP dummy variables in each equatlOn. These dummies 
indicate that the current President is a Democrat or a traditlOnal 
Republican (with the supply-side current President represented in 
the intercept). Note that our model includes the conventional 
two-party classification as a special case in which the coefficients of 
RAP and SSAP are equal and the coefficient of RCP is zero. 
Other independent variables in the two equations include 
economic indicators conventionally appearing in reaction func-
tions To capture inertia in the policy process, the reaction 
functions include the last period's Federal funds rate rt-l (the 
average rate prevailing between meetings t - 1 and t) as an 
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explanatory variable. IS Accounting for inertial effects in this fash-
ion also reduces the potential for serial .correlation of reaction 
function errors.l9 Lagged money growth M1 t - I (calculated as the 
growth rate of the M1 money stock over the two months preceding 
the meeting) enters the model because the money stock has often 
been an explicit intermediate target. 20 The re!llaining economic 
variables are forecasts of "goal" variables, P (the annualized 
percentage rate of inflation based on the Consumer ~rice Index), U 
(the percentage civilian unemployment rate), and IP (the annual-
ized percentage rate of growth in the Federal Reserve's Index of 
Industrial Production).21 The forecasts are computed on the basis 
of data available in the month preceding the month in which 
meeting t occurs and have a three-month-ahead forecasting hori-
zon. Our use of forecasts of target variables and our method of 
calculating these forecasts follow closely the example of Abrams, 
Froyen, and Waud [1980].22 In addition to these explanatory 
18 The hkehhood functIOn for the model presented m AppendIx 1 does not 
specifically account for the presence of a lagged dependent variable If one assumes 
that the last pre-sample observatIOn of the funds rate IS nonrandom, the hkehhood 
function we present IS appropriate EstImates wIll be consIstent m any case 
19 If our model IS altered to permIt first-order serial correlation of the errors 
in mdlvldual reaction functions, then serIal correlatIOn wIll also be present m (6), 
the reduced-fonn equation explainmg the mterest rate Moreover, the serial 
correlation coefficIent for the reduced-fonn errors will approximate that for the 
mdlVldual's reactIon functIons We find that estlmatlOn of (6) by the Hiidreth-Lu 
method provides eVIdence of modest first-order serIal correlatIon, wIth a correlatIOn 
coefficIent p = 0.28 for the model correspondmg to Table I III the text Although the 
assumptIon that p = 0 can be rejected, correctmg for serial correlatIOn m (6) does 
not substantIvely alter the results of that equatIOn 
We have also estimated the model usmg data that have been transformed by 
generalIzed dIfferencmg The results are almost Identical to those reported here, 
and the transformation does ehmmate eVIdence of serial correlatIOn m (6). WhIle 
transformmg the data does not strictly correct for serIal correlation in the context of 
our model, it does prOVIde eVIdence that findlllgs are robust m a more general 
dynamIC specIficatIOn III whIch serIal correlatIOn is less lIkely to be present Further 
detaIls are aVaIlable m an appendIX aVaIlable from the authors We also find that our 
results are robust to other alternatIve specificatIOns of the model's dynamiCs 
20 Hakes and Gamber [1992] support the conclUSIOns of Abrams, Froyen, and 
Waud III findmg that the Fed responded to deVIatIOns of actual from targeted money 
growth prIOr to 1982 
21 Following other reactIOn functIOn studIes, we also conSIdered exchange 
rates and balance of payments measures as pOSSible explanatory varIables Like 
most of those studIeS, we find lIttle eVIdence that mternatIonal varIables have 
consIstently mfiuenced monetary pohcy 
22 Our forecasts are predIcted values from "rolling" regressIOn equatIOns 
explammg each of the three target varIables The regressIOns employed samples of 
60 monthly observations prIor to the forecast penod Each forecastmg equatIOn 
mcluded lagged values of the unemployment rate, the rate of mfiatIon, the rate of 
growth of mdustnal productIOn, the growth rate of Ml, and the federal budget 
defiCIt as a fractIOn of GNP Lag lengths of up to three months were permItted for 
mcluded variables, WIth lag lengths chosen separately for the lagged dependent 
variable and for all other variables (as a grou~) The final lag speCIficatIon was 
selected on the baSIS of maximum adjusted R for a regression over the entIre 
sample perIod 
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variables, estimation of the model requires data for the actual 
postmeeting Federal funds rate, which is measured as the average 
rate prevailing between meetings t and t + 1.23 (A summary of 
variable definitions is provIded in Appendix 2.) 
Our data consist of macroeconomIC variables and individual 
voting records linked to 349 regular meetings24 of the FOMC over 
the 1960-1987 period.25 At a given meetmg, the voting members of 
the FOMC include the seven members of the Board of Governors 
and five of the regional Reserve Bank Presidents. After excluding 
the votes of the Chairman (whom our model treats as an agenda 
setter) and dropping observations assocIated wIth vacancIes, ab-
sences, and several uncodable dissents, the data set includes 3631 
individual voting observations. 
One further empirical issue requires prelimmary attention. 
We have argued that the Federal funds rate is appropriately viewed 
as the Fed's primary policy instrument over most of the sample 
period, but operating procedures have sometimes varied. Of par-
ticular significance is the regime of nonborrowed reserve targeting 
adopted in October 1979 and employed through September 1982. 
Over this period the Fed paId more attention to the behavior of 
monetary aggregates and permitted much larger funds rate fluctua-
tions than it did in previous or subsequent periods. In preliminary 
empirical work our results confirmed shifts in policy rules and 
voting behavior in the 1979-1982 period. Because policy-making in 
this period does not conform well to our assumption that the funds 
rate is the key instrument, we have decided to exclude these 
meetings from further analysis (although key findings on partisan 
influences are in fact robust to their inclusion).26 We retain a 
23 AlternatIvely, we have measured the postmeetmg mterest rate as the rate 
prevallmg m the first complete week after the FOMC meetmg Results are 
essentIally unaffected by thIs change m the specIficatIOn 
24 Our sample excludes telephone meetmgs, for whIch votmg mformatlOn IS 
not complete over the sample period Phone meetmgs were more frequent, and 
ordmary meetmgs less frequent m the latter portIon of the penod, however, the 
average frequency ofmeetmgs IS roughly monthly for the complete sample penod 
25 Havnlesky [1993) suggests that polItIcal mfluences on monetary pohcy 
were lImIted before 1961 Moreover, because the nature of the FOMC dIrectIve 
changed m 1959 to mdlcate more gradual adjustments m monetary polIcy, the 
meanmg of dIssents probably dIffered m the pre- and post-1960 penods Our sample 
also excludes the final four meetmgs m 1987, whIch occurred after Alan Greenspan 
became the ChaIrman 
26 We found that several key parameters dIffered m the 1979-1982 perIod 
The reactIOn functIOn error varIance, ()'2, was larger, as was the dissent threshold 
parameter, A These results mdlcate greater variabIlIty m deSIred mterest rates as 
well as greater tolerance of deViatIOns between deSIred and proposed rates when 
contemplatmg dIssents Lagged money growth also had a larger coeffiCIent durmg 
that penod, whIch IS conSIstent WIth the findmgs of Fall r 1984J Each of the~e 
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sample of 3352 voting observations obtained from 323 FOMe 
meetings, including 99 (3.0 percent) dissents favoring ease, 137 
(4.1 percent) dissents favoring tightness, and 3116 (93.0 percent) 
assents. 
III. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table I summarizes results obtained from estimating the 
empirical model. Our procedure initially produces eleven estimates 
for each parameter; the table presents the mean estimate and the 
mean standard error for each parameter.27 Sign frequencies record 
the number of times (out of eleven) that a parameter was positive 
or negative, and sIgnificance frequencies record the number of 
times (out of eleven) that each parameter differed significantly 
from zero at the 0.10 level. In the bottom panel ofthe table, similar 
significance frequencies are reported for tests involving compari-
sons of coefficients. Single-equation estimates of the reduced-form 
equations for this specification have also been estimated and are 
reported in Appendix 3.28 
The results appear to give a clear answer to the question we 
have posed on the channels of partisan influence. The mean 
coefficients indicate that, other things equal, traditional Republi-
can appointees prefer a Federal funds rate 0.50 points higher than 
Democrats, who in turn prefer rates 1.13 points higher than 
supply-side Republicans. The difference between traditional Repub-
licans and Democrats was significant (at the 0.10 level or better) in 
ten of the eleven individual estimations, while Democrats and 
results is mtUltlvely plaUSible gIVen the change m operatmg procedures. We find 
that once these shifts are allowed for, our findmgs on partisan mfluences are 
essentially unchanged from those reported m the text 
27 Standard errors are calculated by the method of White [1982], producmg 
estImates that are robust to some speCificatIOn errors The average standard errors 
we report are almost surely larger than the true standard errors of the average 
coeffiCients, thus, our mferences about statistical Significance are conservative. 
Standard errors for the mean estimates could til prmclple be obtained through 
bootstrappmg procedures, but computatIOnal costs are prohIbitive Usmg the 
general purpose maximum hkelihood routme in TSP, the estimatIOn reported m 
Table I reqUlred over seven hours of CPU tIme on an IBM 4381 mml-mainframe 
computer 
28 We have estImated reduced-form equatIOns for other speCIfications devel-
oped III the paper, complete results of those estimatIOns are presented m an 
appendIX aVaIlable from the authors upon reque.st. Results from the reduced-form 
estImations are m all cases consistent WIth those denved from the Jomt estImatIOn 
procedure In addItion, we have employed a smgle-equatlOn ordered probit model to 
estimate the structural parameters of (7) under the (unrealistic) assumption that 
the adopted interest rate IS exogenous. Although these estimates are subject to a 
simuitam'lty bIas, they produce results conSIstent WIth our findmgs on partisan 
influences These results are also aVaIlable from the authors upon request. 
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TABLE I 
MONETARY POLICY REACTION FUNCTIONS WITH PARTISAN INFLUENCES 
Mean 
Mean standard Sign Significance 
Parameter /varIable coefficient error frequency frequency-" 
Chairman's parameters 
'I (Chairman's votmg weight) 01579 00949 11/11+ 5/11+ 
00 (constant) 04193 11301 10/11+ 0/11 
OVOLCKER 18842 24719 11/11+ 0/11 
OMILLER 05956 12703 11/11+ 0/11 
1iBURNS -06224 07029 11/11- 1/11-
Individuals' parameters 
'" (dissent threshold parameter) 2 1524 02125 11/11 + 11/11+ 
ao (constant) 14839 0.4493 11/11 + 11/11+ 
aDAP (Democratic appointee) -07814 0.2600 11/11- 11/11-
aRAP (Republican appomtee) -02804 02786 10/11- 5/11-
aSSAP (supply-side appomtee) -19119 05362 11/11- 11/11-
Shared parameters 
a (error standard deViatIOn) 11299 00949 11/11 + 11/11+ 
(3r (lagged funds rate) 09336 00202 11/11+ 11/11+ 
(3MI (M1 growth) 00081 00045 11/11+ 8/11+ 
(3p (mfiatlOn) 00620 00161 11/11+ 11/11+ 
(3zp (mdustnal productIOn growth) 00195 00043 11/11+ 11/11+ 
(3u (unemployment) -01205 0.0311 11/11- 11/11-
(3DCP (Democratic current PreSident) -04221 0.2837 11/11- 3/11-
(3RcP (Republican current PreSident) -03574 0.2840 11/11- 3/11-
Additional tests of hypotheses 
Null hypotheSIS RejectIOn frequency" 
'I-\,i2=0 1/11 
"'DAP - aRAP = 0 10/11 
"'RAP - "'SSAP = 0 11/11 
"'SSAP - "'DAP = 0 9/11 
(3DCP - (3RCP = 0 1/11 
OVOLCKER - OBURNS = 0 1/11 
OVOLCKER - OMILLER = 0 0/11 
OMILLER - 1iBURNS = 0 0/11 
a The level of slgmficance l~ 0 10 
supply-siders differed significantly in nine of eleven cases and 
Republicans and supply-siders differed significantly in all eleven 
cases. These results provide strong evidence of the importance of 
the power of appointment in Presidential influence over monetary 
policy. 
Evidence of direct partisan influence from the President is 
much weaker. A comparison of the coefficients of DCP and RCP 
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indicates that individuals prefer a funds rate just 0.07 points lower 
while serving under Democrats than under Republicans. These 
coefficients differed significantly only once in eleven estimations. 
There is slightly stronger evidence of a shift in policy preferences 
under the supply-side President. Coefficients of DCP and RCP are 
consistently negative and are significantly different from zero in 
three of eleven cases. This indicates that members preferred higher 
interest rates when serving under the supply-side President than 
when serving under Democrats or traditional Republicans. Thus, 
the direct and appointment-induced impacts of the supply-side 
President appear to have worked in opposite directions. 
The preceding result senSIbly matches the historical record. 
During the first Reagan administration, monetarists and conserva-
tives, including Beryl Sprinkel at the Treasury and Martin Feld-
stein at the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), directly signaled 
administration preferences for monetary tightness. After 1984 
administration supply-siders gained the upper hand as Treasury 
Secretary Donald Regan shifted his stance and as key personnel 
changes occurred at the Treasury, the CEA, and the Federal 
Reserve Board. Signaling subsequently decreased as the power of 
appointment became the main vehicle for executive branch influ-
ence over the Fed; the post-1984 Reagan appointees to the Board 
led a movement toward easier monetary policies. 
Although our results strongly indicate that the distinction 
between traditional Republicans and supply-siders is appropriately 
made, we have also estimated the model for the special case in 
which these groups are combined. These results, provided in Table 
II, still show some evidence of party differences, with Republican 
appointees preferring tighter policies. However, both the magni-
tude of the estimated difference and the frequency of significance 
decline; the average difference was 0.25 interest rate points, and 
the difference was significant in just three of eleven estimations. 
The results again indicate that direct systematic partisan influence 
from the current President is negligible. 
The results in Tables I and II are similar in most other 
respects. We find that economic conditions are related to the 
setting of the Fedl~ral funds rate in a manner consistent with the 
results of most previous reaction function studies. The lagged 
funds rate has a large positive coefficient, indicating the presence of 
inertia in the policy-making process The coefficient of lagged 
money growth is also positive and is usually significant, consistent 
with the role of money growth as an intermediate target. Coeffi-
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TABLE II 
REACTION FUNCTIONS WITH REPUBLICANS AND SUPPLy-SIDERS COMBINED 
Mean 
Mean standard Sign Significance 
Parameter /vartable coefficIent error frequency frequencya 
Chairman's parameters 
'I (Ch81rman's votmg weight) 01971 0.0828 11/11+ 9/11+ 
00 (constant) 0.1570 06590 10/11+ 0/11 
OVOLCKER 08449 09603 11/11+ 0/11 
OMILLER 01277 0.7841 7/11+ 0/11 
OBURNS -07723 06238 11/11- 1/11-
IndivIduals' parameters 
A (dIssent threshold parameter) 20572 02190 11/11+ 11/11+ 
ao (constant) 07492 02360 11/11+ 11/11+ 
aDAP (DemocratIc appomtee) -06907 02458 11/11- 9/11-
aRAP (RepublIcan appomtee)b -04473 02661 10/11- 6/11-
aSSAP (supply-sIde appomtee)b -04473 02661 10/11- 6/11-
Shared parameters 
a (error standard deViatIon) 1.0995 01570 11/11+ 11/11+ 
i3r (lagged funds rate) 09518 00187 11/11+ 11/11+ 
13M! (M1 growth) 00077 00044 11/11+ 8/11+ 
i3p (inflatIon) 00608 00138 11/11+ 11/11+ 
i3IP (mdustnal productIOn growth) 0.0221 00042 11/11+ 11/11+ 
i3u (unemployment) -00769 00244 11/11- 11/11-
i3DCP (DemocratIc current PresIdent) -0.0378 00497 11/11- 0/11 
AddItIonal tests of hypotheses 
Null hypothesIs RejectIOn frequencya 
'1- Y,Z = 0 3/11 
aDAP - aRAP = 0 3/11 
OYOLCIG<;R - OBURNS = 0 6/11 
OYOLCKER - /)MILLER = 0 0/11 
/)MILLER - /)BURNS = 0 0/11 
a The level of slgmficance 1., 0 10 
b (tRAP and ClSSAP are constramed to be equal 
cients for the forecasts of inflation and industrial production are 
positive and that for unemployment is negative, as one would 
expect if the Fed attempts to stabilize the business cycle. Coeffi-
cients of each of the three forecast variables differ significantly 
from zero in each ofthe estimations underlying Tables I and II. 
Our results confirm previous studies that have suggested that 
Governors and Bank Presidents behave differently.29 In Table I the 
29 Puckett [1984] and Woolley [1984J report that Bank Presidents have 
dissented more frequently m favor of tIghtness than Governors Havnlesky and 
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negative coefficients of DAP, RAP, and SSAP indicate that Demo-
cratic, Republican, and supply-side Governors all prefer a lower 
funds rate than Bank Presidents (who are represented in the 
intercept). These differences were sIgnificant in all eleven estima-
tions for Democrats and supply-siders, and in five of eleven cases 
for Republicans. Similar results prevail in Table II. 
The estimates also reveal information about the preferences of 
Chairmen. The estimated intercepts of the various Chairmen differ 
by large amounts, but standard errors are also large, and statisti-
cally significant differences between Chairmen are unusual. The 
ordering of preferences is nevertheless instructive. The results of 
both tables show that Volcker preferred the highest funds rates, 
(even though the 1979-1982 observations are deleted), followed by 
Miller, Martin (in the intercept), and Burns.3o By constructing the 
appropriate composite intercepts, we can also compare Chairmen 
and representative FOMC members of various types. In Table III 
we report these composite intercepts in a ranking from easiest to 
tightest, based on the estimates reported in Table I. 
Our model is distinctive in permitting the estimation of voting 
weights attached to the Chairman and to other members of the 
FOMC in the decision-making process. The Chairman's weight 'Y is 
estimated to be 0.158 in Table I (and it is slightly higher in Table 
II).3I Assuming a full complement of eleven other FOMC members, 
the implied weight. for each addit.ional member is 0.077. Thus, our 
estimate indicates that the Chairman has about twice as much 
voting weight as a rank and file member of the FOMC. This 
parameter is not estimated very precisely, however, and in only one 
of eleven estimations was 'Y significantly different from 1/ 12, the 
value that would imply equal weights for the Chairman and all 
others. The hypothesis that the Chairman is dictatorial ('Y = 1.0) is 
consistently rejected, however. 
SchweItzer [1990) report SImilar results based on the estimatlOn of a bmary probit 
modeL However, Tootell [1991b) fails to find significant dIfferences between 
Governors and PreSIdents based upon a multmomiallogit analysIs See Havnlesky 
[1993] for a cntique of Tootell's analysis 
30 Usmg aggregate reactlOn functlOns, Hakes [1990) found evidence of a shIft 
m reactIOn functlOn coeffiCIents under Arthur Burns (relative to Volcker and 
Martm). Belden [1989) also reports evidence of changing FOMC voting patterns 
under the Burns Chairmanship, however, her findings are challenged by Havrilesky 
and Glidea [1991a] Havnlesky [1993) reports that under Burns the Fed systemati-
cally responded to AdmIlllstratlOn SIgnalS for monetary ease but not to sIgnals for 
tightness Thus, the apparent polley ShIftS under Burns mIght best be attnbuted to 
executive branch pressures 
31. We dId not Impose the constramt -y > 1/12 m the estimations summanzed 
m our tables; however, estimated values for -y below 1/12 were mfrequent 
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TABLE III 
COMPOSITE INTERCEPTS FOR MEMBER TYPES AND CHAIRMEN 
Chatrman/member type Composlte intercept Estimate 
Supply-slde Governor ao + aSSAP -043 
Burns 00 + OBURNS -0.20 
Martm 80 042 
Democratic Governor ao + aDAP 070 
Mlller 80 + OMILLER 102 
Repubhcan Governor aD + aRAP 120 
Bank Presldent aD 148 
Volcker 00 + OVOLCKER 230 
Table I indicates that A, the threshold parameter, equals 2.15, 
implymg that dissents occur only when an individual's desired 
funds rate differs from the selected rate by more than 2.15 points. 
This is a large number in relation to typical shifts m postmeeting 
interest rates, but it is also true that dissents are quite rare, 
occurring on only 7.0 percent of all votes by non-Chairmen. If 
dissents are infrequent, our model must account for that phenome-
non with a high dissent threshold.32 
IV. EXTENSIONS OF THE BASIC MODEL 
The results so far support the proposition that Presidents 
exert systematic partisan influence on monetary policy by way of 
their appointments to the Board. In contrast, direct influence from 
the President, with the possible exception of Reagan-specIfic 
effects, does not appear to be strongly related to partisan ideology. 
In this section we consider extensions of the model m which dIrect 
influence from the current President might yet play an important 
role. 
32. In an extenSIOn of the model, we have permltted errors to be correlated 
across members at a given meetmg. A positive correlatIOn of errors across members 
would provlde an alternative explanatIOn for the mfrequency of dlssents It would 
suggest that dlssents occur mfrequently because members often agree with one 
another, perhaps because they respond m similar ways to variables omitted from 
the model Our results with the generallzed model tended to produce estimates of -y 
that were ImplauSibly low (below 1/12) unless a constratnt was lmposed When-y 
was constratned to equal 1 / 12, the error correlatIOn was never Significantly different 
from zero Estimates for A were not much lower than those reported in Tables I and 
II, although standard errors for the A estimates were conslderably larger Appar-
ently, multicollinearity makes It difficult to dlstmgUlsh between high values for A 
and correlated errors as explanations for mfrequent dlssents Results on partisan 
differences with the generalized model were similar to those reported m the text 
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One possibility is that influence from the President is chan-
neled through the Chairman, but not through other FOMC 
members. This hypothesis is especially plausible for two reasons. 
First, the Chairman is generally acknowledged to be the FOMC's 
link to external dients, including the administration. Second, 
Chairmen serve only four-year terms and, to further their chances 
of reappointment, may be particularly responsive to the current 
President. 
This hypothesis can be tested in a very simple way. We alter 
the basic model to allow the coefficients of the current President 
dummies, DCP and RCP, to differ for Chairmen and for all other 
members. If coeffieients ofthese variables differ in the Chairman's 
equation and if the Chairman has a large voting weight, we would 
conclude that direct partisan Presidential influence by way of the 
Chairman exists. 
For the estimation reported in Table IV the coefficients ofDCP 
and RCP for Chairmen are given by the sums 13DcP + 13CHMDCP and 
I3RcP + I3cHMRcP (equivalently, I3cHMDcP and I3cHMRcP measure 
differences in the coefficients of Chairmen and non-Chairmen). The 
results for this model provide weak but suggestive evidence for the 
hypothesis that the Chairman is an agent of the President. The 
estimates reveal large upward shifts in the Chairman's intercept 
when the President is a traditional Republican or Democrat 
relative to the case where the President is a supply-sider. This 
suggestion of a direct Reagan influence favoring ease through the 
Chairman is compatible with the ease orientation of the Reagan 
appointees, but contrasts with our finding, discussed earlier, that 
the direct influence of monetarists and other nonsupply-siders in 
the Reagan administration encouraged tighter policy preferences 
among rank and file committee members. Given the confounding 
pressures on policy during the Reagan years and the inherent 
limitations of the data, one should interpret this result with 
caution. 
Table IV also provides weak evidence that Democratic and 
Republican Presidents exert differing partisan influences through 
the Chairman. The estimates imply that the Chairman's intercept 
shifts upward by 0.87 points when a traditional Republican 
replaces a Democrat in the White House. This is a large shift in the 
expected direction, but the difference is not statistically significant 
in any of the eleven estimations summarized by the table. 
In a second extension ofthe model, we investigate whether the 
partisan identity of the current President could matter in a 
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TABLE IV 
REACTION FUNCTIONS PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE VIA THE CHAIRMAN 
Mean 
Mean standard SIgn SIgnIficance 
Parameter /varIable coeffiCIent error frequency frequencya 
ChaIrman's parameters 
'I (ChaIrman's votmg weIght) 01782 00869 11/11+ 7/11+ 
00 (constant) -30099 34946 11/11- 0/11 
OVOLCKER 34736 29447 11/11 + 4/11+ 
OMILLER 07752 12260 11/11 + 0/11 
OBURNS -04826 06215 11/11- 0/11 
~CHMDCP (ChaIrman Democratlc 
PreSIdent) 38123 35044 11/11+ 2/11+ 
~CHMRCP (ChaIrman RepublIcan 
PreSIdent) 48320 41234 11/11+ 3/11+ 
IndIVIduals' parameters 
~ (dIssent threshold parameter) 21349 02168 11/11+ 11/11+ 
('(0 (constant) 1.8981 05346 11/11+ 11/11+ 
('(DAP (DemocratIc appomtee) -08000 02574 11/11- 9/11-
('(RAP (RepublIcan appomtee) -02659 02734 10/11- 2/11-
('(SSAP (supply-sIde appomtee) -20194 05544 11/11- 11/11-
Shared parameters 
IT (error standard deviatIOn) 11027 01032 11/11+ 11/11+ 
~r (lagged funds rate) 09317 00201 11/11+ 11/11+ 
~MI (M 1 growth) 00077 00045 11/11+ 7/11+ 
~p (mflatIOn) 00594 00164 11/11+ 11/11+ 
~IP (mdustrIal productIOn growth) 00197 00043 11/11+ 11/11+ 
~u (unemployment) -01240 00314 11/11- 11/11-
~DCP (DemocratIc current PreSIdent) -07607 04130 11/11- 6/11-
~RCP (RepublIcan current PreSIdent) -09106 04032 11/11- 8/11-
AdditIonal tests of hypotheses 
Null hypotheSIS RejectIOn frequency' 
'1-YI2=O 3/11 
('(DAP - ('(RAP = 0 10/11 
('( RAP - ('(SSAP = 0 11/11 
('(SSAP - ('(DAP = 0 10/11 
i3DCP - i3RCP = 0 1/11 
~DCP + i3CHMDCP - i3RCP - i3CHMRCP = 0 1/11 
OVOLCKER - 0BURNS = 0 5/11 
OVOLCKER - OIVIILl ER = 0 6/11 
OMILLER - OBURNS = 0 0/11 
a The level of slgmficallu.> B 0 10 
distinctly political, rather than ideological, fashlOn. Political pres-
sures on the Fed vary over time, but it is reasonable to assume that 
they most often push in the direction of monetary ease. As 
politicians, Presidents are likely to respond to politIcal pressures by 
Co ri hI © 2001. All Ri hIs Reserved. 
PARTISAN MONETARY POLICIES 207 
relaying them to the Fed, and Fed Governors, who are Presidential 
appointees, may then be especially responsive in their policy-
making behavior. Our results indicating that Governors favor 
"easier" policies than Bank Presidents are consistent with the 
latter point. Furthermore, political loyalty may lead Governors to 
be more sensitive to pressure for low interest rates when they serve 
under a President of the same party as their appointing President. 
This suggests another modification of the model: allow differences 
in the intercepts of "in-party" and "out-party" Governors. To do 
so, we add the dummy OUT to the individuals' reaction function. 
This variable equals one for Governors appointed by a President of 
the out-party and otherwise equals zero.33 
The intriguing results of this estimation are presented in 
Table V. In all eleven estimations the OUT coefficient was positive 
and significantly different from zero. The implication is that 
Governors respond to the needs of own-party Presidents by 
succumbing to pressures for monetary ease and that they 
"sabotage" opposition incumbents by promoting monetary tight-
ness. Thus, the partisan identity of the current President does 
seem to matter, but not in the manner predicted by partisan 
business cycle models driven by ideological concerns. 
The preceding results also offer an appointments-related 
explanation for a political monetary policy cycle. When partisan 
change occurs, appointees of the preceding administration push for 
higher interest rates under the new opposition administration, and 
this produces early-term tightness. As time passes, the composition 
ofthe Board shifts toward appointees ofthe current President, and 
pressures for lower interest rates mount. According to this view, 
pre-election ease occurs not because a new election is imminent, 
but because the last election is further in the past.34 
Thus far, we have found only weak evidence to support the 
view that direct Presidential influence generates partisan move-
ments in monetary policy choices. However, Woolley [1984, p. 109] 
reports that "there is a substantial consensus that presidents 
generally get the monetary policy they want from the Federal 
Reserve."35 Together, these findings suggest that Presidential 
33 GlVen the focus on pohtIcal loyalty (not Ideology) in thiS argument, we have 
considered Reagan as a Repubhcan m defimng thiS variable 
34. The conventIOnal argument for pohtIcal monetary cycles contends that an 
m?-mment electIon mduces PreSIdential pressures on the Fed for ease, which in turn 
stimulates the economy and gratifies voters (cf. note 2) 
35. An anonymous Fed official has directly acknowledged that pohtIcal SignalS 
are heeded: "We beheve that credit conditIOns are reasonable. We aren't gettmg any 
Signals from pohtIcmns I can't see any reason to deviate from current pohcy" 
[Wall Street Journal, July 21, 1980] 
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TABLE V 
REACTION FUNCTIONS WITH OUT-PARTY E~'FECTS 
Mean 
Mean standard SIgn SIgnIficance 
Parameter /variable coefficient error frequency frequencya 
Chairman's parameters 
-y (ChaIrman's votmg weight) 01637 01005 11/11+ 5/11+ 
Bo (constant) 05097 10456 9/11+ 0/11 
BVOLCKER 15760 28088 10/11+ 0/11 
BMILLER -02360 10296 8/11- 0/11 
BBVRNS -09066 0.9900 11/11- 1/11-
IndIVIduals' parameters 
A (dIssent threshold parameter) 21393 0.2160 11/11 + 11/11+ 
ao (constant) 1.4086 04528 11/11+ 11/11+ 
aDAP (Democratic appomtee) -0.9659 02687 11/11- 11/11-
aRAP (Republican appomtee) -0.4276 0.2843 10/11- 5/11-
aSSAP (supply-side appomtee) -18281 05336 11/11- 11/11-
aOVT (out-party governor) 03681 01396 11/11+ 11/11+ 
Shared parameters 
cr (error standard deVIatIOn) 11132 01062 11/11+ 11/11+ 
J3r (lagged funds rate) 09377 0.0199 11/11+ 11/11+ 
13M! (M1 growth) 0.0081 00045 11/11 + 7/11+ 
J3p (inflatIOn) 00630 0.0163 11/11+ 11/11+ 
J3IP (industrIal productIOn growth) 0.0205 00042 11/11+ 11/11+ 
J3u (unemployment) -0.1177 00314 11/11- 11/11-
J3DCP (DemocratIc current President) -0.3880 02869 11/11- 3/11-
PRCP (Repubhcan current President) -03462 02866 11/11- 3/11-
AddItIonal tests of hypotheses 
Null hypothesIs RejectIon frequencya 
-y - Y12 = 0 3/11 
aDAP - aRAP = 0 10/11 
aRAP - aSSAP = 0 10/11 
aSSAP - aDAP = 0 5/11 
J3DCP - J3RCP = 0 0/11 
BVOLCKER - BBVRNS = 0 1/11 
BVOLCKER - BMILLER = 0 0/11 
OMILLER - BBURNS = 0 0/11 
a The level ofslgmficance 18 010 
pressures might be effective wlthout being systematically parti-
san, a possibility which we investigate in a third extension of our 
model. 
To investigate this hypothesis, we drop the current President 
partisan dummies from the model's reaction functions and replace 
them with the SAFER index (Signaling from the Administration to 
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the Federal Reserve) described by Havrilesky [1988b, 1993]. The 
SAFER index measures Presidential preferences by coding state-
ments made by administration spokesmen and reported in the 
financial press. The index is calculated as the monthly sum of Wall 
Street Journal articles reporting statements advocating easier 
monetary policy (coded 1.0) and tighter monetary policy (coded 
-1.0). Our reaction functions employ SAFERt-I. the value of 
SAFER calculated for the month preceding the month of the 
FOMC meeting. Clearly, the statements coded by SAFER need not 
follow consistent partisan patterns; in fact, frequencies of ease and 
tightness signals are similar across administrations. 
Results for the SAFER-augmented model are reported in 
Table VI. In each of the eleven estimations summarized there, the 
SAFER coefficient was negative and significantly different from 
zero, in accord with the view that monetary policy accommodates 
the desires expressed by Presidential signaling. These results 
confirm and strengthen those reported by Havrilesky, who found 
that SAFER influenced money growth in the 1979-1984 period 
[1988b] and the Federal funds rate in the 1964-1991 period [1993]. 
The results permit us to reconcile our conclusions with the 
conventional view that Presidential pressures influence monetary 
policy choices, but they also leave an unanswered question. Why 
does partisan ideology appear to play an important role in the 
appointment of Governors but not in patterns of direct Presiden-
tial influence? 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
U sing a methodology that permits the estimation of individual 
reaction function parameters, we have analyzed partisan influ-
ences exerted by U. S. Presidents on individual members of the 
FOMC. Our results strongly suggest that the power to make 
appointments provides an important channel of systematic parti-
san influence. We find that Democratic appointees favor easier 
monetary policies than traditional RepUblicans do, and that supply-
side Republicans prefer even easier policies than Democrats do. 
Regional Reserve Bank Presidents tend to prefer tighter policies 
than the politically appointed Governors. 
Evidence of systematic and direct partisan influence of the 
current President on Fed Governors is weaker in our estimations, 
but this does not imply that Presidents have no direct influence 
over the Fed. In this paper we find some evidence of direct 
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TABLE VI 
REACTION FUNCTIONS INCLUDING THE SAFER INDEX 
Mean 
Mean standard SIgn SIgnIficance 
Parameter / vanable coefficIent error frequency frequencya 
ChaIrman's parameters 
-y (Chairman's votIng weIght) 01544 00896 11/11+ 2/11+ 
llo (constant) 
-05219 11998 8/11- 0/11 
llvOLCKER 36421 30447 11/11+ 1/11+ 
bMILLER 14574 16479 11/11+ 0/11 
llBuRNs -00827 0.5533 10/11- 0/11 
IndIViduals' parameters 
A (dIssent threshold parameter) 21218 02027 11/11+ 11/11+ 
"'0 (constant) 10220 02553 11/11+ 11/11+ 
"'DAP (Democratic appoIntee) -07373 02731 11/11- 9/11-
"'RAP (RepublIcan appoilltee) -03299 02731 10/11- 3/11-
"'SSAP (supply-sIde appoIntee) -16145 04754 11/11- 11/11-
Shared parameters 
a (error standard deVIatIOn) 11183 0.0928 11/11+ 11/11+ 
fir (lagged funds rate) 0.9462 00172 11/11+ 11/11+ 
flMI (M1 growth) 00077 00041 11/11+ 9/11+ 
flp (InflatIOn) 00494 00139 11/11+ 11/11+ 
flIP (Industnal production growth) 00120 00040 11/11+ 11/11+ 
flu (unemployment) -01019 00261 11/11- 11/11-
flSAFER (signalIng Index) -00679 00229 11/11- 11/11-
AddItIonal tests of hypotheses 
Null hypothesIs ReJectIon frequency" 
-Y-Y12=0 1/11 
"'DAP - "'RAP = 0 8/11 
"'RAP - asSAP = 0 11/11 
"'SSAP - "'DAP = 0 9/11 
llvOLCKER - bBL"RNS = 0 3/11 
bVOLCKER - llMILLER = 0 1/11 
llMILLER - llBuRNs = 0 1/11 
a The level of slgmficance IS 0 10 
Reagan-specIfic effects and suggestions that Presidents exert parti-
san influence through the Chairman. Moreover, Presidential signal-
ing appears to be effective without being either continual or 
systematically partisan.36 
36 Havnlesky [1991] notes that sIgnalIng IS Itself sensItive to the state of the 
economy and the partIsan compOSItIOn of the Board of Governors, as well as the 
shIftIng preferences of PresidentIal admlmstrations For example, signalIng was 
persistent during Nixon's first term, Carter's term, and Reagan's first term when 
each faced a troubled economy and a Board domillated by out-party appoilltees 
However, signalIng fell off durIng Reagan's second term and durIng Gerald Ford's 
Interregnum, as economic condItIOns Improved and as the Board came to have a 
friendlIer partisan composItIon 
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Our analysis also suggests that strategic political motives are 
relevant in explaining FOMC voting patterns. Partisan-appointed 
Governors desire higher interest rates when serving under a 
President of the opposing party than they do when serving under 
an own-party President. Given the timing of the appointments 
process, this politically motivated behavior could produce an 
apparent electoral cycle in monetary policies. 
The institutional arrangements governing Federal Reserve 
decision-making reflect a balancing of concerns: policymakers 
should simultaneously be accountable to the public and be resis-
tant to immediate political pressures. To evaluate the balancing of 
those concerns on the basis of empirical evidence requires an 
analysis of behavior at the level of individual decision-makers. Our 
analysis takes a step in that direction; it confirms the importance of 
partisanship in appointments for the conduct of monetary policy. 
Further study of the microfoundations of Fed decision-making 
may ultimately provide a basis for evaluating different appoint-
ment procedures and other proposed institutional changes. 
APPENDIX I: THE LIKELIHOOD FUNCTION FOR THE MODEL 
Appendix 1 provides the likelihood function for the estimated 
model. For each meeting t, assume that we observe two endogenous 
variables: a postmeeting interest rate and the vote of a single 
FOMC member on the monetary policy directive. We arbitrarily 
denote the member whose vote is observed as member i. 
We begin by compactly reformulating equations (6) and (7). 
Equation (6) can be rewritten as 
r t = Zt'IT + U t , 
where Zt is a vector of exogenous variables, 'IT is a vector of 
reduced-form coefficients, and U t is the composite error term: 
U t = 'YeOt + (1 - 'Y )et · 
Conditions (7) characterizing the probit voting model can be 
compactly reformulated as 
if W,t8 + V,t > }.., then V,t = -1; 
if W,t8 + V,t < -}.., then V,t= 1· , 
if -}.. ~ W,t8 + V,t ~ }.., then V,t = O. 
Here Wa is a vector of exogenous variables, e is a vector of 
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reduced-form coefficients, and V,t is the composite error term: 
V,t = ,,(eot + (1 - ,,(Yet - e,t· 
Let g(ut,v,t) be the joint density of U t and V,t. ThIs density is 




a~ = "(2a2 + (1 - "( )2a2 / N 
a~ = "(2a2 + (1 - "()2a2/N + a 2 - 2(1 - "()a2/N 
a~u = "(2a2 + (1 - "()2a2 /N - (1 - "()a2/N. 
The joint density of the observed variables, rt and V'I> can be 
defined for each of three cases J E {I,II,III}. The joint density 
relevant for case J is denoted hJ(rt,v,t). 
CASE I. v,t = -l. 
When v,t = -1, then V,t > A - W,tE}, and the joint density hj(rt,vzt) 
is given by 
A joint density can be expressed as a product of marginal and 
conditional densities, enabling us to rewrite this equation as 
where 
f() is the standard normal density function, 
<1>( ) is the standard normal distribution function, 
/-Lulu = p(au/au)(rt - Zt'tT) , 
aul u = (Tu(1 - p2)O 5. 
CASE II. V,t = l. 
When v,t = 1, then Va < - A - W,tE), and the joint density hn(rl> V,t) 
is given by 
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CASE III. V,( = o. 
When V,t = 0, then - A - W,(@ :S U,t :S A - W,(0, and the joint 
density hnr(rt,V,t) is given by 
f "-w,,e hm(r(,Vtt ) = g(rt - Zt'lr,U,t) dU,t 
-I\-W,te 
The likelihood function for the sample of T meetings is given 
by 
T 
L = II [d~hI(rt,va) + d:1hn(rt,v,t) + d:nhm(rt,V,t)], 
(=1 
where d~, d:I, and d:II are dummy variables, respectively, indicating 
which case characterizes observation t. The reduced-form parame-
ters can be expressed as functions of the structural parameters 
using the restrictions implied by (5), (7), and (A. 1). Maximum 
likelihood estimates of the structural parameters are those values 
that maximize L. 






Dummy variables equal to one for meetings when the 
indicated Chairman served; otherwise equal to zero. 
A dummy variable equal to one for Democratic 
appointees; otherwise equal to zero. 
A dummy variable equal to one if the President when 
meeting t occurs is a Democrat; otherwise equal to 
zero. 
The three-month-ahead forecast of the growth rate 
of the Federal Reserve's Index of Industrial Produc-
tion; calculated at time t using information available 
in the month prior to meeting t. 
The annualized percentage rate of growth of the 
money supply; measured as the difference in log Ml 
over the two months preceding meeting t. 
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A dummy variable equal to one for members ap-
pointed by a President of the party not currently 
occupying the Presidency; otherwise equal to zero. 
The three-month-ahead forecast of the rate of infla-
tion (the annualized percentage rate of change in the 
Consumer Price Index); calculated at time t using 
information available in the month prior to meetmg 
t. 
The average Federal funds rate prevailing in the 
interval between meeting t and meeting t + 1. 
The average Federal funds rate prevailing in the 
interval between meeting t - 1 and meeting t. 
A dummy variable equal to one for traditional (i.e., 
non-Reagan) Republican appointees; otherwise equal 
to zero. 
A dummy variable equal to one if the President when 
meeting t occurs is a traditional (non-Reagan) Repub-
lican; otherwise equal to zero. 
For the month preceding the month in which meet-
ing t occurs, the sum of Wall Street Journal articles 
reporting administration statements favoring easier 
monetary policy (coded 1.0) and tighter monetary 
policy (coded -1.0). 
A dummy variable equal to one for supply-side 
Republican appomtees (i.e., Reagan appointees), oth-
erwise equal to zero. 
The three-month-ahead forecast of the unemploy-
ment rate; calculated at time t using information 
available m the month prior to meeting t. 
A discrete variable indicating the vote of FOMC 
member l in meeting t; equal to -1.0 for a dissent 
favoring ease, 1.0 for a dissent favoring tightness, 
and 0 for an assent. 
APPENDIX 3: SINGLE-EQUATION ESTIMATES OF REDUCED-FoRM 
EQUATIONS 
As noted in the text, it is possible to estimate the reduced form 
given by (6) and (7) with single-equation estimation methods. 
Equation (6), explaining the postmeeting Federal funds rate, can 
be estimated by ordinary least squares; mequalities (7) can be 
estimated as an ordered pro bit model. In Table VII we provide 
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reduced-form estimates for the model corresponding to Table I in 
the text. 
Estimates ofthe OLS equation employ 323 time series observa-
tions corresponding to FOMe meetings from 1960-1987 (exclud-
ing the 1979-1982 period of nonborrowed reserve targeting). For 
the ordered probit model, two sets of estimates are provided. First, 
we provide estimates that use data pooled over all 3352 voting 
observations. Alternatively, we provide averages of estimates ob-
tained from eleven mutually exclusive subsets of the data, such 
that only one vote per meeting is included in each data subset. This 
is done because error terms are correlated across members within a 
meeting, so that pooling results in a violation of an assumption of 
the ordered pro hit model. For the ordered probit model we 
normalize by setting au = 1.0 and adopt the sign convention that 
TABLE VII 
MONETARY POLICY REACTION FU!>(CTIONS WITH PARTISAN INFLUENCES 
REDUCED-FoRM OLS AND ORDERED PROBlT ESTIMATES 
Averaged ordered 
Pooled ordered problt estimates 
OLS estimates pro bit estimates equatlOns (7) 
equation (6) equatlOns (7) 
Mean 
Standard Standard Mean standard 
VarIable Coefficient error Coefficient error coefficient error 
CONSTANT 13123 0.5623 02597 0.4720 01703 1.5767 
BURNS -00237 00933 -0.1368 00703 -0.1594 02478 
MILLER 01862 01463 -08443 01962 -0.7361 0.5389 
VOLCKER 06293 02995 -02583 0.1945 -03370 0.5752 
DAP -08647 0.5838 -15660 09107 -14698 30471 
RAP -03662 05881 -00574 09217 01104 30798 
SSAP -2195.8 0.8871 -17454 12721 -12608 39649 
DAP 07715 0.0872 08055 02995 
RAP 01013 0.0894 01365 03116 
SSAP 14675 0.2059 1.4159 05396 
rt-l 09264 00185 
111t-l 00079 0.0046 
r 00534 00144 
IP 0.0185 00041 
(; 
-01392 00320 
DCP -0.1911 03354 
RCP -0.1044 03376 
A' 1.9571 00379 20515 01393 
(Tv 10000 10000 
(Tu 03540 
Copyright © 2001. All Rights Reserved. 
216 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
the underlying latent variable should be interpreted as a "propensi-
ty to dissent favoring monetary ease." In Table VII, A. is the 
threshold parameter for the reduced-form ordered pro bit model, 
and O"u and <Tv are standard deviations for the error terms for (6) and 
(7). 
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